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This study focuses on Commercial Construction ‘construct-only’ and ‘fully documented’ contracts 
where the Lead Architect is also defined as the contract Superintendent and Principal’s Representative. 
The paper argues that there is a conflict-of-interest herein, given the defined and the implicit roles of the 
Superintendent under contracts such as AS2124 & AS4000. There is a prevalence of adversarial 
relationships ‘in which cooperation is expected to take place in a set of circumstances that are not wholly 
conducive’ (Phua & Rawlinson, 2010) between internal stakeholders in commercial construction 
contracts, and the paper aims to review this impact on the overall the outcome of the project.  
 
This research proposes to question the status-quo in these particular contractual arrangements, and the 
impact that these relationships are having on individual projects, and the industry at large. The research 
aims to provide a review of the current literature relative to the topic; assesses the impact of the 
aforementioned dual-role Superintendent; evaluates industry opinion on the potential conflict of interest; 
and seeks to provide a conclusive argument that would be the foundation for changing the definition of 
the Superintendent role under AS2124 & AS4000 in particular. 
 
Finally, the paper aims to provide insight into reducing the potential for conflict within the commercial 
construction industry by eliminating conflicts of interest, assessing internal stakeholder relationships, 
and identifying the stipulation for a third-party Superintendent in Construct Only contracts such as 
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‘A construction contract is no different to any other commercial agreement with perhaps the exception 
of the role of the superintendent.’  





1.1 Introduction  
 
The commercial construction industry is a highly stressful, notoriously adversarial and financially 
volatile sector. The myriad of relationships within the environment can be frequently tested during a 
project and are all-to-often soured at the time completion is achieved. Hence, it is crucial where possible, 
to mitigate potential conflicts of interest within these relationships to give the project, and the inter-
relationships within, a chance to harmonise and accomplish the best result possible for all stakeholders. 
 
Whilst there is a large body of research around construction contract disputes, there is a gap in the 
instance of head contract superintendents who are also engaged as lead designers, on fully-documented, 
construct-only projects. According to University of Melbourne research which was completed under the 
watch of Professor John Sharkey, between 3 December 2013 and 14 February 2014, in which 295 
respondents were surveyed in relation to 379 projects: ‘the use of standard forms was almost unanimous 
on contracts valued less than $100,000. The percentage of standard forms used for contracts valued 
between $100,000 and $500 million, ranged between 66% and 78%. However, the use of standard forms 
dropped for contracts valued over $500 million, at 28%’. The use of standard form contracts across the 
industry is in the majority, however this research will attempt to outline the prevalence - and attempt to 
understand the impact of - Superintendent / Lead Design dual-role in construct-only projects through 
the use of a questionnaire.  
 
The argument is that there is a conflict of interest with in this inter-role duality, particularly given the 
financial and reputational damage that can be sustained as the project life cycle evolves. A conflict can 
have multiple interpretations, however, is conceptually defined as a ‘difference between two or more 
beliefs, ideas, or interests’ (Conlin et. al. 1996, Aibinu et. al. 2008). The research aims to understand if 
there is the potential for conflict, whereby the omissions or shortfalls in the design are examined by the 
head contractor, and the dual-role superintendent’s obligation to be fair and impartial can be hindered 
by their desire to uphold the expectations of, and maintain a positive relationship with the Principal. 
Further to this, beyond the reputational impacts, the impact of design errors and omissions can reflect 
poorly on the Superintendent, and consequently, relationships between internal stakeholders can be 
strained. The paper will analyse these relation impacts, and how the role can be amended to mitigate the 
pressure on internal parties. A typical stakeholder relationship hierarchy for a construct-only project is 







1.3 Research Objectives 
 
In order to mitigate the impact of perceived conflicts of interest that exist within current standard form 
contracts. The objectives of this research are: 
 
• Understand the typical roles of the internal stakeholders in a construct-only contract; 
• Understand the typical role of the Superintendent as assessor, evaluator and principal’s 
representative under the contract; 
• Understand and analyse the impact the conflict of interest has on the overall outcome of the 
project, and on relationships of internal stakeholders. Understand the limitations of 
‘impartiality’ in the contractual and common law context; 
• Develop strategies to mitigate the relational impacts resultant from the perceived conflict. 
Exploring the notion of collaboration between internal stakeholders; 
• Propose and validate potential measures for change within the Standard form and provide 
comparative & research-based analysis against other industry-standard forms. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
 
The limitation of this research is, in particular, the extent to which the superintendent is involved not 
only as the traditional certifier, assessor and principal’s representative, but in the instance where they 
are fundamentally involved in the design and its management. The conflict in this role generally refers 
to the superintendent’s requirement to be ‘impartial’, whilst also being employed by – or contracted to 
– the principal, whilst undertaking the previously mentioned functions. This study aims to further define 
this conflict by examining the superintendent’s relationship to the design of a project and analysing the 
impact this involvement has on the outcome. It is acknowledged also, that superintendent duality is often 
discussed in terms of their role as principal’s representative, and administrator of the head contract. For 
the purpose of this research the dual-role superintendent refers to their role as: 
 
a) Principal’s representative and contract administrator; 
b) Designer and design manager. 
 
This paper is further limited by the role of the superintendent under commonly used, construct only 





For the purpose of this research the title ‘superintendent’ will be used to refer to the individual 
undertaking the role of the Principal-engaged contract administrator. Further, the title ‘principal’ will 
be used for the client, owner, or the person or group for which the project is being funded by. The title 
‘certifier’ will used for the role otherwise known as building certifier, surveyor, or the individual or 
organisation who is novated to oversee compliance measures are met and implemented on behalf of the 
principal and ultimately certify the project for completion. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The overall scope of the research will be broken down into Five (5) main chapters, with the information 
further examined into the following format; 
 
Section One broadly summarises the paper on the whole, by outlining the structure and organisation of 
the research. Further, this section outlines the relations of internal stakeholders within the industry, and 
how individual roles can impact on the overall outcome of the project. This portion of work highlights 
the main arguments and deduces the reasoning for the requirement of the research and its intended value 
within the industry. 
 
Section Two reviews the existing literature relevant to the research, and further develops the ideas 
outlined in Section One. Detailed information and analysis are posed on the role of the Superintendent 
in Standard Form contracts; evidence surrounding how the dual-role Superintendent impacts the project 
performance; potential for likely propensities of the Superintendent, including the likelihood for 
impartiality; and performance assessment against other forms of construct-only contracts. 
 
Section Three provides the framework for which the data is collected and collated for evidential 
assembly. This section outlines the parameters in which information will be processed, and how this 
information will be analysed. This section will focus on multiple different, yet relevant Case Studies, 
and the parameters for the industry specific Questionnaire.  
 
Section Four deduces the evidence-based data collected for the project. The section outlines the different 
scenarios and rationalises the results based on information quantified from multiple different sources 
within the industry. This section will form the basis of the conclusion and provide recommendations 





Section Five concludes the research, assessing the original aims of the paper and assessing them in line 
with University prescribed objectives. Discussion into the limitations and potential shortcomings of the 











































As previously noted, there is ample literature on the nature, and potential methods for avoidance of, 
construction contract disputes. However, in this instance the need for literature review is to understand 
the role of the Superintendent, particularly in a fully-documented, construct-only project. Further, the 
literature review will determine what is deemed to be reasonably ‘fair and impartial’ when reviewing 
potential design errors and omissions and the impact on the contract budget and programme. This section 
aims to understand exactly who the parties to a project are and examine the inter-relationships that exist 
on a project. Lastly, the review will assess the potential impact this will have on the project in terms of 
relationships of the project teams, impacts on the success of the project and whether the Superintendent 
can reasonably assess given their involvement in design. 
 
The two most commonly used ‘construct-only’ head contracts in Australian commercial construction 
are AS2124 & AS4000, the review will use these two contracts as the basis for the assessment. 
 
This section will be divided into eight (8) subsections: 
1. Introduction; 
2. Construction Project Stakeholders; 
3. Types of Contracts; 
4. Role of the Superintendent; 
5. Superintendent Fairness & Impartiality; 
6. Dual-role Superintendent & the Conflict of Interest; 
















2.2 Construction Project Stakeholders 
 
There are various different roles and responsibilities for internal stakeholders within a construction 
project. This section will outline those relevant and provide an overview of the inter-relationships 
between parties and their impact on the success of the project. Figure 1 visualises these relationships 
and displays the interconnectivity between Principal – Architect – Head Contractor, and the design 
consultants and certification authorities.  
 
2.2.1 Principal  
 
The Principal is an individual, organisation or body which provides the capital for the project. There are 
various different types of Principals, including all three levels of government, property developers, 
consortiums, communities, individuals and more. It is assumed that the Principal has limited specific 
project knowledge and ‘high-level’ involvement and as such is represented by a ‘Principals 
Representative’, or Superintendent under the contract. 
 
2.2.2 Main Works Contractor / Builder 
 
The Main Contractor (MC) is responsible for delivering the project is engaged directly by the Principal 
through a contractual agreement. The contractor will have the necessary licencing requirements 
particular to the region the project is in, and specific to the scope of the project works. A range of project 
deliverables will be outlined in the contract documentation that the contractor will be required to produce 
to the Principal on an agreed date and for an agreed amount (depending on the contract arrangement).  
 
2.2.3 Architect / Superintendent 
 
The architect is responsible for the design and documentation of the project. Under AS2124 or AS4000 
the architect can be engaged by the Principal directly, and an individual from the firm often is delegated 
the role of Principal’s Representative / Superintendent. ‘It is the Architect who will most likely be the 
Superintendent as their objectives align with the principal to oversee the contractor, mediating as 
required.’ (Fewings 2005) 
 
This role entrusts decision making powers on behalf of the Principal, including but not limited to, 
determination of variation and extension of time (EOT) claims, latent conditions, progress claims and 







In the instance of construct-only contracts such as AS2124 & AS4000, the Principal will either directly 
engage the consultants, or the architect will appoint the consultants for design related components of the 
project. Specific disciplines will be responsible for various design elements of the project, for example; 
structural, hydraulics, mechanical and electrical engineering. The consultants will be responsible for 
ensuring the construction works are carried out in accordance with all relevant documentation including; 
Australian Standards, Building Code of Australia, National Construction Code, all relevant site-specific 
requirements etc.  
 
The goal of these first four stakeholders is the collaborative delivery (Figure 3) approach in order to see 
the best outcome for all parties. 
 













For the purpose of this paper the term certifier will be maintained. Licensed Building Certifiers can 
work for local government or in a private practice. They inspect a project before, during and at 
completion to ensure it complies with the approved building plans (approval of development permit for 
building works), and appropriate building standards. (qbcc.qld.gov.au) The certifier should be involved 
from conception to completion of the project to ensure the relevant and current standards are maintained 
and executed correctly throughout the project. The certifier is the ultimate building authority on the 
project, they will issue a Certificate of Occupancy once all the required evidentiary documentation has 





























2.3 Standard Form Contracts 
 
Matthew Bell (2009) notes that standard form contracts in construction can been seen throughout 
history, dating back to a document known as the Code of Hammurabi in around 1760 which outlines 
‘stipulations as to the consequence of poor workmanship…’ pre-dating Bellgrove v Eldridge [1954] 
HCA 36 ‘by nearly 400 years’. ‘In the early 20th century, British courts and contractors recognised a 
need for a standard form of civil engineering contract, and in 1930 the Federation of Civil Engineering 
Contractors and the Association of Consulting Engineers managed to publish a form of contract’ (Wright 
& Fergusson, 2009). Although it was conceded that the 1930’s contract was not widely used or 
recognised, it set the foundation for future standard form contracts. This standard form contract became 
the basis for the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) original standard form, which was drafted in 1945, 
and then later on for the FIDIC suite of contracts which will be discussed further on. In the US it was 
noted by Chakravarty & Bentley MacLeod in 2004, that the most widely used standard form contract 
was ‘published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA), who produced its first form contract for 
general sale in 1915’.  
 
 
2.4 Types of Standard Form Contracts 
 
The primary focus of this study is aimed at two standard form, construct only contracts, namely AS2124 
and AS4000. These two contracts, along with other standard form contracts ‘continue to dominate the 
Australian construction contracting landscape.’ The study found that ‘the four main forms (AS4300 
(23% of projects using a standard form), AS4000 (18%), AS2124 (17%) and AS4902 (14%)) represent 
close to 70% of the standard forms which are used.’ (Sharkey, et. al., 2014)  
 
According to Sharkey’s findings the remainder of the contracts found in the sample were: 
• International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) forms, generally in larger, private 
projects; 
• GC21 form, which will be discussed further on in the study, generally in NSW public industry 
for contracts over $5 million; 
• Australian Building Industry Contracts (ABIC), which are ‘jointly published by the Australian 
Institute of Architecture (AIA) and Master Builders Australia.’ (www.architecture.com.au). 
Particularly the Major Works (MW) used mostly for private, individual residential contracts up 




2.4.1 AS2124-1992 & AS4000-1997 
 
‘The Australian Standard (AS) series of contracts are produced for Standards Australia by a panel of 
industry representatives that appear on their covers. However, the origins of AS2124 date back to the 
mid 1920’s to a contract developed by the Australian Institution of Engineers.’ (Shnookel & Charrett, 
2010) The standard forms are generally considered to be a ‘fairer’ and more balanced contract for all 
parties, however conversely ‘they are likely to contain many compromises.’ (Sharkey et. al., 2014) 
Sharkey also noted that Standards Australia intended to discontinue AS2124 after the introduction of 
AS4000, however at the time of this research the standard remained available for use. 
 
Evans (2012) noted some ‘of the features of Australian Standard contracts are that they:  
• have been designed to balance the risks with respect to the contract are widely used and enjoy 
a high level of recognition; 
• allow a level of status of the bill of quantities; 
• allow for the provision of a superintendent to administer the contract; 
• involve a lump sum price; 
• have the option of staged practical completion 
• apply to construction in both the public and private sector.’ 
 
Shnookel & Charrett go on to highlight the special conditions, or amendments which have become 
routine in the use of AS contracts. ‘(A)s word-processing became commonplace, major law firms with 
an engineering and construction focus developed in house Special Conditions that amended the standard 
form contracts.’ The development of these changes was, generally speaking, to change the balance of 
the liability and, as much as possible, transfer the risk to the contractor. However, these special 
conditions came with inherent ambiguities and caused issues, particularly in the event of arbitration. 
The potential for contradictions between the special conditions and the standard clauses of the AS 
contracts is cause for a ‘large number of contract disputes’, and the industry has now reached a point 
where law firms are often engaged for drafting and, in turn, signing head contracts. Risk shifting and 
the allocation of risk will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
 
In 2015, there was a release for comment for the since rescinded AS11000 which was intended to 
supersede AS2124 & AS4000. Professor Ian Bailey SC (2015) noted that the new standard’s potential 
impact on the resolution of disputes. ‘The proposed new general conditions of contract in AS 11000 
provide a broadly balanced approach to risk allocation in language which is focused on brevity and 
certainty. They include a new early warning procedure based upon an express good faith obligation, 




2.4.2 FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction (CONS) – ‘The Red Book’ 
 
The Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs Conseils or International Federation of Consulting 
Engineers have a five-coloured suite of contracts ranging from Yellow for ‘plant and design-build’, 
Green for ‘short form’, silver for ‘Turnkey operation’ and Gold book for ‘design-build-operate’. The 
Red Book is relevant to this paper as it is nominated as ‘construction designed by the employer’.  
 
Whilst there is no Superintendent per se, the FIDIC contracts were traditionally authorised by the 
Engineer, which ‘enabled him to make informed judgments concerning the conduct and execution of 
projects with a large measure of independence from the Employer (Principal).’ ‘A key feature of the 
dispute - resolution procedure contained in the FIDIC 4th Edition 1987, sub-clause 67.1 – ‘Engineer’s 
Decision’ was the power and authority of the Engineer to make independent judgements’ (Robinson, 
2011) However, over time the Engineers power has become diminished, and the FIDIC contracts have 
been seen in the industry as transferring more risk to the contractor.  
 
The 4th edition of the 1987 iteration FIDIC Red Book SFC stated under sub-clause 2.7 an obligation for 
the engineer when performing valuations or issuing directions to act ‘impartially within the terms of the 
Contract and having regard to all the circumstances.’ The removal of this express obligation in the 1999 
iteration, and replacement with sub-clause 3.5 stating that the engineer must ‘make a fair determination 
in accordance with the Contract, taking due regard of all relevant circumstances.’ 
 
The most recent iteration being the second edition of the Red and Yellow Books (2017) includes sub-
clause 3.1(a) defines that ‘the Engineer whenever carrying out his duties or exercising authority …shall 
be deemed to act for the Employer (Principal)’ and sub-clause 3.1(b) goes on to clarify that ‘that the 
Engineer has no authority to relieve either Party of any duties, obligations or responsibilities under the 
Contract except as stated in the Contract.’ Finally, the new sub-clause 3.7 which obliges the engineer to 
‘act neutrally between the parties’, and the implication that the engineer is no longer deemed ‘to act for 
the employer’.  
 
Ellis Baker (2009) noted that ‘in a traditional engineering (or construction) contract in making 
determinations may indeed include impartiality; the word ‘fairness’ in this context has several 
connotations and impartiality is one of them.’ Further, that the ‘…express duty of fairness in making 
determinations under the Red, MDB, Yellow and Gold Books would involve acting impartially as 






2.4.3 GC21 Edition 2 
 
The GC21 Edition 2 contract is predominantly used in NSW and ACT state government projects, and 
‘is suitable for construction contracts valued at more than $1 million. GC21 may also be appropriate for 
construction contracts valued at less than $1 million when special circumstances and/or requirements 
exist (e.g. the use of milestones).’ (procurepoint.nsw.gov.au) The GC21 contract differentiates itself 
from the AS standard forms by adopting ‘the stance that the Contractor will always have some level of 
responsibility for completing the design’, (Manderson et. al., 2015) and as such does not specifically 
have a design and construct or construct only stipulation. This creates and underlying responsibility to 
invest their expertise into the design, with the intention to create a more open and collaborative approach 
as outlined in Figure 3. At a fundamental level, in an unamended standard form contract for a construct 
only project, the contractor merely has to fulfil their ‘duty to warn’ – which can be satisfied by 
submission of an RFI or Head Contract Advice Notice. This obligation does not promote collaborative 
contracting and fosters the potential for a contracting party to retain their building expertise in search of 
potential claims through the exploitation of the design deficiencies or omissions.  
 
‘A key aspect of the GC21 Contract is that there is no Superintendent. Both the Contractor and the 
Principal appoint representatives called “Authorised Person”, whose role is to liaise with each other to 
administer the Contract and overlying this are the Principal and Contractor’s “Senior Executive”, who 
have responsibility for the health of the contract relationship.’ (Joseph & Mashiah, 2014) Should Senior 
Executives be unable to resolve disputes the GC21 has a provision for third party intervention and 
determination.  
 
One of the more effective tools under the GC21 contract is the summary table provided defining the 
‘Role of the Authorised Person in a GC21 Contract’. This summary provides contracting parties the 







Figure 4: Extract of GC21 'Roles of Authorised Person' (Source: procurepoint.nsw.gov.au) 
 
 
2.4.4 ABIC MW-1  
 
‘Compared to AS 2124 and other forms in the AS Suite (and ABIC’s predecessor, JCC), there have been 
relatively few cases on ABIC, and even fewer that have engaged in detail with the provisions of the 
contract.’ (Bell, 2009) The propensity for the ABIC suite of contracts to have reduced disputes could be 
due to a variety of reasons, however it does show a positive inclination for what should be the basis for 
all standard form contracts – being reduction of disputes between contracted parties. This could be 
interpreted as contrary to this research, as the conflict still exists as discussed in the following paragraph.  
 
‘In these contracts there is a dual role for the Architect. For example, the Architect is charged with acting 
impartially when valuing progress claims while also acting as an agent for the Owner when issuing 
instructions or directions to the Builder (contractor).’ (McLaughlin & Lovegrove, 2008) Clause A6.2 
states that the architect administers the contract on behalf of the owner (principal). ‘The architect is the 
owner’s agent for giving instructions to the contractor but acts independently – not as an agent – when 
acting as assessor, valuer or certifier.’ (Butcher, 2019) In terms of the role of the architect under the 
ABIC MW-1, their functions include issuing schematic and detailed design, tender processes, contract 
administration and issuance of the final certificate.    
 
Similar to many AS Standard Form contracts, the ABIC suite entrusts the architect - acting as the 
Superintendent - with the regulation of the contract, whilst being responsible for the design elements of 
the project. Cotton (2015) observed that ‘(t)his can be akin to walking something of a tightrope for an 
Architect, because the retainer agreement he has with the Owner/Developer will state that he/she must 
act only in the Owner’s best interests, whilst the building contract itself says that the Architect must be 





2.4.5 Department of Defence – Head Contract (HC-1 2003) 
 
The HC-1 2003 forms part of the Department of Defence suite, and can be used in construct only, design 
& construct, or document & construct arrangement. The paradigm of the contract is set out on the 
Defence Estate Quality Management System (DEQMS) website, however there is very little peer-
reviewed literature or mention in educational resources on the use of the HC-1, or any comparison to 
the Standard form. 
 
The equivalent role to the Superintendent under the HC-1, and other contracts in the Department of 
Defence suite, is that of the Project Manager Contract Administrator (PMCA). The definition of the 
PMCA’s role as explained in the HC-1 contract; ‘The Contract Administrator will give directions and 
carry out all of the other functions of the Contract Administrator under the Contract as the agent of the 
Commonwealth (and not as an independent certifier, assessor or valuer).’ (Department of Defence 2003) 
There is a clear distinction of the role of the PMCA as an agent of the principal, the Australian 
Commonwealth. This provides a clear and definite obligation for impartiality on behalf of the 
superintendent, insofar as they must represent the Commonwealth’s best interests whilst providing 
equitable treatment of the contractor when administering the contract. 
 
Similar to the GC21, the Defence suite of contracts have a succinct layout, and proforma appendices to 
compliment the relevant claims that can be made.  
 
2.4.6 New Engineering Contract (NEC) – Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) 
 
The NEC came after a review into civil engineering and construction contracts by the Institution of Civil 
Engineers (ICE) in the United Kingdom in 1985. The ‘NEC Engineering and Construction Contract 
(ECC) developed with three main aims:  
 
• Clarity and simplicity; 
• Flexibility of use (for different contract strategies, different engineering and construction 
disciplines, use in different countries); 
• Stimulus to good management.’ 
 
Similar to the traditional superintendent, the ‘Supervisor is appointed by the Employer, acts on his behalf 




checking the contractors work.’ (Weddell & Weddell, 2006) One distinguishable element of the ECC is 
the implementation of the Supervisor and the Project Manager and the distribution of their roles which 
are covered under Clause 14 of the contract. The Project manager will ‘administer the contract on behalf 
of the Employer and is the designated authority to issue all instructions, notifications and other 
communications required under the contract.’ Whilst on the other hand, the supervisor’s sole 
responsibility is to ‘check for compliance to the Works Information (basically to check for defects and 
is independent to the Project Manager).’ (Hide, 2011) 
 
Out of all the standard forms, most fail to include the more contemporary delivery methods such as 
alliancing and partnering. The ‘NEC3 also contains a secondary option – X12 Partnering – which is 
used to create multi-party partnering arrangements and is ideal to support the creation of an Alliance.’ 
(Infrastructure Client Group, 2016) NEC3 also requires that parties are to act ‘in a spirit of mutual trust 
and co-operation’. Whilst this content has been slated as ambiguous and broad, it has also been 




























2.6 The Role of the Superintendent 
 
At the very core of the role and responsibility of the superintendent is their duty to act in accordance 
with the contract, and their roles under that contract. Legislation definitively recognised this in the 
United Kingdom 2006 Scheldebouw BV v St James Homes case, where it was deemed that the ‘foremost 
duty of the contract administrator is to discharge the functions which he is expressly required to perform 
under the construction contract pursuant to which he attains authority.’ 
 
The central roles of the Superintendent in the construction contract are to preserve the best interests of 
the principal, by administering the contractual obligations of all parties whilst ensuring performance, 
compliance and adherence to necessary regulations by the Main Contractor. ‘There is a view that there 
is tension between the superintendent's role as agent and that as a certifier… (T)he two roles do co-exist 
under Australian law where the superintendent is not to act simply to further the principal's interests. 
(www.constructionlawmadeeasy.com) The superintendent is a pivotal component in the construction 
process, and the importance of this function should not be understated. ‘Contractors are very much 
dependent on the capability of the client’s representative (superintendent). (Soetanto & Proverbs, 2002)  
 
Functionally, the primary functions of the superintendent may include; the assessment of contractor-
issued claims, including Extension of Time (EOT) submissions and Head Contract Variation (HCV) 
entitlements; issuing Superintendents Directions (SD) and coordinating & distributing responses to 
Requests for Information (RFI); and overseeing the functions and responsibilities of design 
management. 
 
‘AS2124 and AS4000 are designed for use on major building and engineering projects where a 
‘superintendent’ is engaged to administer the contract. The superintendent may be an independent 
professional (or a firm of consultants) or an employee of the principal.’ (Sharkey et. al., 2014). Horan 
(2000) defines a dual role of the Superintendent; ‘(t)raditionally, the principal and the contractor will 
enter a construction contract where they agree that the principal will engage a superintendent: to issue 
directions to the contractor on behalf of the principal, as its agent, as permitted under the head 
construction contract to carry out the tasks of certification, assessment and valuation under the 
construction contract independent of the principal and the contractor.’ Similarly, the Administration 
Manual for AS 4000 -1997, (HB 140-2000) notes the dual roles; ‘Firstly, as agent of the Principal in 
conveying the Principal’s instructions to the Contractor and in carrying out the role of ordering changes 
to the Works e.g. by directing variations pursuant to Clause 40; Secondly, the Superintendent performs 
the function of certifier or assessor for the purpose of arriving at a reasonable measure or value of work, 





The reviewed literature specifies the Superintendent is a representative of the Principal who shall act 
‘…reasonably and in good faith’ under AS4000, and that ‘…by virtue of this clause …is required to act 
in professional manner and must not be influenced by the Employer (Principal) or the Contractor in 
reaching the decisions.’ (Danuri et. al., 2007) It is this imposed neutrality of the Superintendent that is 
critical to this research paper and will be evaluated in further detail. Given the subjective nature of 
impartiality, there are obvious restrictions on conclusive outcomes, however the importance of 
maintaining a culture of reasonable and professional relationships within contractual agreements should 
not be understated. ‘For future success, construction companies need to change from an adversarial 
culture, where blame is apportioned, to a culture of sharing. (Egbu, cited in Lloyd-Walker et. al. 2014). 
Further to this understanding the significance of the role enables ‘capable representatives (to) allow 




2.7 Remuneration of the Superintendent 
 
The Superintendent will either be a direct employee of, or contracted by, the Principal. Therefore, the 
Superintendent will be payable as an employee, or a contractor dependent on their agreed contractual 
arrangement. Horan (2000) notes that in previous years Superintendents were engaged simply on a letter 
of engagement or a standard form agreement, however as with head contracts, ‘very detailed consultancy 
agreements are being submitted to superintendents which effectively codify the services to be provided’. 
This, in effect, could further impact the Superintendent’s ability to administer fairly and impartially, as 
they are necessarily required to act in accordance with what has been stipulated in their contract.  
 
The consultancy agreement, should there be one, will outline the Principal’s obligations in terms of 
remuneration of the contract. An example of a commonly used consultancy agreement in the Australian 










2.8 The Process of Administering Construction Claims 
 
A claim in its theoretical form is the perceived entitlements, be they monetary or other, of an individual 
or organisation, pursuant to a relevant clause under the contract to which they are engaged. For example, 
‘…any additional payment, extension of time and/or damages for any alleged breach of duty by the 
employer or employer’s management team.’ (Aibinu et. al., 2008) 
 
The traditional role of contract administration requires an assessor, the Superintendent, to review and 
decide on the submissions of the Contractor as to the validity and the rationale with respect to the specific 
contract. Aibinu goes on to describe that the ‘claims process may also involve negotiation between the 
Employer (Principal) and the Contractor. However, the matter may be referred to other forms of 
resolution when negotiation ends in a deadlock. This may include litigation, or alternative dispute 
resolution methods such as arbitration, conciliation, or mediation.’  
 
Proper contract administration is pivotal to the success of a project and can provide all internal 
stakeholders with the confidence that contractual processes are being adhered to, and that submissions 
will be appropriately administered. Inversely, the impact of poor contract administration on behalf the 
superintendent can be profound in terms of generating trust in assessment of claims. ‘The creation and 
preservation of trust and cooperation… can unify the internal stakeholders to a positively-motivated 



















2.9 Disputes Caused by Contract Administration 
 
One of the definitive international dispute reports which has been running for the past nine years, is the 
Arcadis Global Construction Dispute Reports. In 2019, the report found that the overall global average 
value of disputes was $33 million (US), which was down from the previous year $43.4 million (US). 




Figure 5: Average Disputes 2019 (Value and Length) Source: Arcadis, 2019 
 
 
Whilst there are no significant trends in terms of value, there is evidence that the length of disputes is 
increasing. This significant escalation of the drawn-out processes of dispute resolution, further adds to 
frustration of stakeholders.  
 
One of the key findings of this report, specifically in the United Kingdom, revealed that ‘almost two-
thirds of the survey respondents stated proper contract administration would have had the single largest 
impact in avoiding the disputes they were involved in.’ (Arcadis, 2019) ‘Failure to properly administer 
the contract’ was the top cause of dispute in 2017 globally, and third most prevelant in 2018. This 
highlights a significant issue globally, and specifically in the UK, which has close similarities to the 





The below table ranks the top three dispute causes over the past five years, as quantified in the Arcadis 




Table 4: Top Three Causes of Dispute, Globally (Source: Arcadis) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, failure to properly administer the contract has appeared in the top three 
causes of dispute for the last five years and has been the top cause for four of the past five years. This is 
a significant finding and reveals that contract administration is a global concern.  
 




1. Failure to properly administer the contract; 
2. Poorly drafted or incomplete and unsubstantiated claims; 





1. Failure to properly administer the contract; 
2. Poorly drafted or incomplete and unsubstantiated claims; 





1. Failure to properly administer the contract; 
2. Poorly drafted or incomplete and unsubstantiated claims; 
3. Employer/Contractor/Subcontractor failing to understand and/or comply with 





1. Failure to properly administer the contract; 
2. Errors and/or omissions in the contract documentation; 






1. Owner/Contractor/Subcontractor failing to understand and/or comply with its 
contractual obligation; 
2. Errors and/or omissions in the contract documentation; 





2.10 Superintendent as Valuer, Assessor & Certifier 
 
As previously mentioned, the Superintendent is, generally speaking, not a signatory to the contract, 
however still privy to, and plays a significant role in the implementation and administration of the 
agreement. As stated in Perini, ‘the duty of both principal and contractor is 'to do all co-operative acts 
necessary to bring about the contractual result', and that includes not interfering with the superintendent's 
role as certifier, assessor and valuer. (Horan, 2000) These roles are each individual and require 
significant attention to the way they are carried out, particularly in the instance where the Superintendent 
is also the lead designer.  
 
With respect to valuation, it may be argued that this role could be (and sometimes is) administered by a 
Quantity Surveyor (QS). What the QS may not gain an overall grasp upon however, is the unique 
idiosyncrasies of the project and the specific details of the design. Whilst a QS may be able to quickly 
perform a simple take-off of materials and labour, they will likely never understand the finer details in 
the same detail the Superintendent, particularly the lead design Superintendent, will. When a 
Superintendent is valuing works it is ‘necessary to ensure that the works as completed are in accordance 
with the technical requirements of the drawings and specifications and are free of defects.’ 
(www.mcmullun.net)  
 
Liability to the Principal will be discussed later in the paper, however there is the potential that a 
Superintendent may be held liable for decisions made with respect to contractual assessments made 
during a project. The role of the Superintendent as certifier may encompass such assessments as; EOT’s, 
variations, payment certificates, disputes, certificate of substantial or practical completion and many 
more. The role of certifier in particular requires extra attention as ‘the duties of a certifier override the 
agency obligations the superintendent owes to the principal the principal cannot direct the 
superintendent how to act as a certifier.’ (www.constructionlawmadeeasy.com) A common 
contradiction can exist in the definition of the role of Superintendent as a certifier, between what may 
commonly be stipulated in the construction head contract and what may commonly be stipulated in the 
consultancy agreement. ‘For example, the superintendent may agree to act at all times as agent of the 
principal. This would be inconsistent with most standard form construction contracts which require that 
the superintendent not act as agent when acting as certifier.’ (Horan, 2000) Horan goes on to note that a 
safeguard against any such ambiguity would be to give precedence to ‘the obligation to administer the 






2.11 Superintendent Fairness & Impartiality 
 
‘In construction contracts there is (at least) an implied term that even though the Superintendent is 
usually appointed and paid by the Employer, the Superintendent will act fairly and independent when 
acting as a certifier.’ (Danuri et. al., 2007) Herein lies the conflict of which the argument is based upon. 
As long as the Superintendent is employed and remunerated by the Employer (Principal), there will 
always be the underlying commitment to favour the Principal and the residual bias will be apparent. 
Despite the Superintendent having ‘duties to both principal and contractor, he or she has a duty to the 
achievement of the contractual aim. Although the principal and the contractor are supposed to be 
cooperating in that achievement, in practice they are very soon evidencing their competing commercial 
concerns. Yet he [or she] is required to try to hold the balance between those contenders.’ (Dorter & 
Sharkey, 1990) Some limitations exist in relation to this statement, particularly given the commercial 
nature of construction contracting. Berger & Ong (2013) nominate four factors as a playing a casual role 
in conflicts escalating into disputes: ‘competitive tendering, lopsided risk allocation, bias of 
superintendent, and failure to comply with the contract,’ these will all be discussed further on in the 
paper. Berger & Ong go on to state that the ‘perception of bias… emanates from the dual-role of the 
superintendent’.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the superintendent has to wear to hats, as such creating a duality dilemma. 
One hat when acting as agent of the principal, the other when fulfilling duties as decision-maker under 
the contract. 
 




Under AS2124 the ‘Principal shall ensure at all times there is a Superintendent and that in the exercise 
of the functions of the Superintendent under the contract, the Superintendent – 
 
(a) acts honestly and fairly; 
(b) acts within the time prescribed under the contract or where no time is prescribed, within a 
reasonable time frame; and 
(c) arrives at a reasonable measure or value of work, quantities or time.’ 
 
In AS 4000, it is the Superintendent that is required, under clause 20, to fulfil their role and functions 
“reasonably and in good faith”.  
 
The express obligation of the Superintendent to fulfil his role and functions “reasonably and in good 
faith” had been included in the since rescinded AS 11000. Under clause 23 of the Draft AS 11000 the 
Superintendent was merely required to act “honestly”. (www.cglaw.com.au, 2015) However, the 
inclusion of the concept of expressly including Subclause 2.1 ‘Good Faith’ as defined below, creates an 
‘overriding obligation on principals and contractors to act in good faith’. 
 
The Principal and the Contractor each agree -  
 
(a) to act reasonably in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation, and generally in good faith towards 
the other; and  
(b) that such action shall not derogate from their obligations to comply with the Contract." 
  
The R\etired Honourable Lady Justice Ardern (2013) notes that ‘the trend to incorporate express good 
faith obligations has been interpreted as part of an attempt to move away from an adversarial approach 
to contract law.’  
 
Comparatively, the HC-1 contract separates itself from the aforementioned contracts, by expressly 
nominating ‘that the Superintendent acts as agent of the principal only.’ (Bailey, 2018) Whilst this is 
clearly expressed in the HC-1 contract, in the absence of the terms, the requirement for the 
Superintendent to refrain from interference or bias is implied. Bailey further states that ‘it is… better to 
emphasise the necessity for independence and professional accuracy rather than the need for fairness’.  
 
‘In the Policy Document submitted to the Attorney-General on Australian Contract Law by the Civil 
Contractors Federation (CCF) in July 2012 the CCF made some recommendations in relation to the 
Standards Australia AS 4000-1997 contract… (t)he provisions dealing with Superintendents are 




positive duty to do so.’ (Maritz & Putlitz, 2014) This submission by the CCF highlights the potential 
for, and lack of stipulation surrounding Superintendent fairness and impartiality, and the requirement 
for more contractual implications surrounding this contractor-perceived bias. 
 
Perini Corporation v Commonwealth of Australia [1969] is the most relevant case law applicable to the 
requirement for impartiality on a Superintendent’s behalf, even if the nominated Superintendent is an 
employee of the Principal. The plaintiff’s (Perini Corporation) core argument was that the ‘… the 
Director of Works (Superintendent)… acted in a manner that was outside his mandate’  
 
‘In summary, the Court concluded: - 
  
1. The Director of Works was a certifier under the Contract and as such had certain duties imposed 
on him by the Contract; 
  
2. The Director of Works had a discretion as to whether or not he would grant an extension of 
time; 
  
3. In making his decision, the Director was entitled to consider departmental policy but would be 
acting wrongfully if he were to consider himself as controlled by departmental policy; 
  
4. There was an implied term in the Contract that the Commonwealth would not interfere with 
the Director of Works' duties as certifier; and 
  
5. There was an implied term of the contract that the Commonwealth would ensure that the 













2.12 Knowledge of Contract and Construction Law 
 
Construction contracts come in varying sizes and can have conflicting intentions. Toll v Alphapharm 
Pty Ltd (2004) has meaningful application in the construction industry, particularly in the instance 
Justice Byrne found that ‘…where there is no suggested vitiating element, and no claim for equitable or 
statutory relief, a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual 
terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not 
read the document.’ The implication here is at that regardless of an individual’s or organisation’s legal 
comprehension or industry-specific knowledge, once they have signed a contract, they are liable to the 
terms and conditions under said contract (within reason). As such, the importance of thorough 
investigation and comprehension of a contract prior to execution should be of the upmost importance, 
regardless of the perceived amicable environment that precedes issuance.  
 
Understanding contract law would be a seemingly necessary requisite for any Superintendent, however 
there is evidence in research papers of Superintendents - be they architects, engineers or other – having 
a fundamental lack of comprehension when it comes to administering a contract. This lack of 
understanding can have the potential to create ambiguity on behalf of both the principal and the 
contractor and place the Superintendent in an awkward position when having to explain their actions or 
omissions to their employer. Bosch and Philips (2013) noted that education is the best for of remedy for 
contractual ignorance, stating that ‘students should understand the philosophy behind the regulatory 
regimes and develop an awareness of the complex regulation that governs the construction industry so 
that they are able to identify when it impacts on their activities, and ensure they are always in 
compliance.’ Indeed, there is evidence that all parties subject to commercial construction contracts are 
not as educated, as they perhaps should be. 
 
Gerber (2009) noted the differences in the way a legal student should be taught the law, and the way a 
construction or engineering student should be taught. She states that ‘helping construction students to 
not be intimidated by law, and to come to appreciate and understand its impact on their work, is much 
more art than science.’ She further concludes that ‘(i)t is important that law subjects for construction 
and engineering students should not be designed to teach them the law, nor turn them into bush lawyers. 
Rather, the curriculum and pedagogy should be aimed at students developing skills that enable them to 
recognize when there are legal ramifications or implications to a problem, and the knowledge and skills 
to respond appropriately.’  
 
Adequate comprehension and understanding of a reasonable level of contract and construction law can 




of claims. This understanding could also provide the superintendent an intrinsic confidence in their own 
ability that may not be limited by their hesitance to administer due to fear of contractor reprisal, 




































2.13 Superintendent Liability 
 
‘The Superintendent is in a contractual relationship with the Proprietor (Principal) to perform his 
functions (all of his functions whether as agent of the Proprietor or as an assessor/certifier under the 
construction contract). This liability will arise, potentially, both in contract and in tort’, 
(www.mcmullan.net) as in Brickhill v. Cooke where the NSW Supreme Court, Court of Appeal ‘held 
that a principal could sue an engineer in tort as well as in contract.’ Along with ensuring there is at all 
times a Superintendent, under the AS contracts, there is the requirement for the Principal to act upon 
any instance of alleged contractual breaches or under-performance caused by the Superintendent. 
‘Generally, the contractor and superintendent are not in a contractual relationship and therefore the 
superintendent has no contractual liability to the contractor’. However, as seen in John Holland v 
Majorca & Bruce the court may determine there is a perceived duty of care ‘if the contractor relies and 
depends upon the careful and impartial performance of the superintendent’ 
(www.constructionlawmadeeasy.com). 
 
‘To the extent that the superintendent fails to perform in accordance with its duties under the contract, 
that liability is liable to be sheeted home to the principal, who will then have its own remedies in contract 
(and arguably in tort) against the superintendent for breach of its terms of engagement.’ (Mead, 1997) 
Given the architect’s role as a certifier Mead goes on to say that ‘under the standard contracts, there are 
provisions which expressly provide for a mechanism in the event that the superintendent's certificate is 
to be disputed.’ When deducing his decision in John Holland v Majorca & Bruce, Justice Byrne 
referenced SW Nielsen v PVC Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd where it was acknowledged the builder relied 
upon the ‘careful and impartial performance by the architect of its certifying functions’, however went 
on to state ‘it is clear that the question of the rights and remedies of the builder for acts and decisions of 
the architect were considered by the builder an (sic) the proprietor... and... it is... not appropriate for me 
to seek to engraft upon the contractual background a tortious obligation.’  
 
Mead & Newell (1999) infer that the Superintendent is most at risk of exposure to Principal and 
Contractor in its role as the certifier. Whereby ‘its determinations will have immediate economic 
consequences for both parties’, and despite not being party to the contract, ‘it will agree to bind itself to 
the obligations cast upon it under that contract’. As with the John Holland case, Justice Byrne considered 
the case of Bryan & Maloney, which determined that due to the proximity of the relationship between 
the contractor and the architect ‘that the common law recognises the existence of the duty to take 






2.14 Impact of Internal Stakeholder Relations on Project Success 
 
The traditional adversarial relationship between internal stakeholders in a project has been widely 
criticised and refuted as a successful method of project management. Levin (2008) argues that ‘building 
projects may be initiated with time and cost budgeting, with all parties working towards a profitable 
outcome and with goodwill and understanding. But when the relationship breaks down and the parties 
fall out, they will not act sensibly.’ There is still consensus that this is the most common state evident 
in the industry, particularly in large commercial projects where performance of internal stakeholders is 
critical, and financial & reputational impacts are on the line. Larson (1997) saw this relationship as 
characterised by a focus on win–lose, suspicion of each other, withholding or manipulating information, 
ineffective problem solving, and unfair risk allocation.  
 
This conspiratorial behaviour is unfortunately inherent in many commercial construction projects in 
Australia and will often result in a hindrance on the success of the project as a whole. Highlighting this 
behaviour was Odeh & Battaineh’s 2002 study which concluded ‘…contractors regarded contractual 
relationships the most important (cause of delay), while consultants considered project management 
issues to be the most important’. Further to this, Song et. al. (2009) discussed the potential to develop a 
positive relationship between internal stakeholders through early contractor involvement. Determining 
that not only could there be benefits from using the contractor’s specific knowledge and understanding, 
but through maintaining the relationship throughout the course of the project there would be heightened 
potential for greater understanding and co-operation between the parties. Through this understanding 
and via the creation and preservation of a mutual trust, ‘the interaction between a contractor and a 
















2.15 Dual-role Superintendent & the Conflict of Interest 
  
Regardless of the Superintendent’s relationship with the parties to the contact, the role is inherently 
burdened with this conflict of interest, which becomes ever-present when the Superintendent is also 
responsible for the creation of the design documentation. Horan (2000) notes that ‘…when assessing 
the contractor's work, the superintendent can be faced with the dilemma of determining whether the 
superintendent's own design-related work may have contained inconsistencies, ambiguities or real 
errors, or may have been delivered in such an untimely manner as to have affected the contractor's ability 
to achieve practical completion within the contractual time frame.’ Horan goes on to discuss the 
difficulty of objectivity in this situation, however, maintains that the professionalism of the 
Superintendent, regardless of where their financial interests lie, is paramount to preserving already 
tarnished industry standards.  
 
Aside from the aforementioned design-related encounters, the Superintendent needs to play an important 
role in stakeholder relationship management. Due to the direct contact between the Superintendent, the 
Principal and the design team, and given the previously noted adversarial tendencies, there will 
inherently be perceived bias on behalf of the contractor. ‘Paradoxically, principals can be drawn to a 
belief that, in granting variation claims and awarding delay costs, the superintendent may be conspiring 
with the contractor, especially where the superintendent's remuneration is a percentage of the contract 
sum.’ (Horan, 2000) These circumstances of mistrust and conspiratorial behaviour are detrimental to 
not only the project, but potentially to the wider industry.  
 
Precedent regarding the common dispute of a Superintendent’s independence from the Principal is 
recognised in Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Limited [2002] NSWCA 211. 
Whereby, East Asia acting as the Superintendent, engaged by Peninsula, had ‘common directors and 
overlapping ownership’, and failed to disclose this at execution of the contractual agreement with 
Abigroup. With reference to this agreement the referee stated: ‘Whatever the actual effect might be, I 
would be in no doubt that a further obligation to be Peninsula's agent in all matters in relation to the 
design and construction of the project would tilt the balance to some extent in Peninsula's favour.’ Justice 
McMurdo further summarised ‘there is no tenable construction of [cl 35.5 as amended] by which the 
Superintendent could be said to be under any obligation and in particular an obligation to extend time if 







2.16 Ethical Obligations of the Superintendent 
 
Dependent on the professional discipline of which the Superintendent practices under, if any, each 
individual will be at least morally obligated to ensure their adherence to a list of both defined and implied 
ethical parameters which will determine their function and decision making in what can be a hostile 
environment. For example, under the Engineers Australia (EA) Code of Ethics, Item 1.1 – ‘Demonstrate 
Integrity, act on the basis of a well-informed conscience… act impartially and objectively.’ (Engineers 
Australia). As ‘much of the construction process is still operated and controlled by professionals who 
are often appointed to carry out an ‘independent’ certifying process’ (Uff, 2003), ethics still plays an 
integral part in the functional role of the Superintendent. As previously noted in Section 2.8, it is not 
uncommon for a contractor to believe the Superintendent is acting in an unethical matter, and while an 
explicit duty may not exist under the contract, the courts have determined that the obligation can exist 
in tort.  
 
The function of the Superintendent to act in an ethical manner ‘plainly depends for its viability on the 
appointed, engineer, architect or surveyor acting in a professional and ethical manner when carrying out 
functions such as valuing work and determining extensions of time.’ (Uff, 2003) Ethical behaviour is 
increasingly essential when the design element is added to the role. Adding the emotional attachment of 
design and the potential for reputational impacts due to poorly executed, or under-designed 
documentation, to the mix places dual-role Superintendents’ under increased strain. This increased 
pressure can lead to individuals setting aside their ethical obligations (as they are generally not expressly 

















2.17 Relationship Management 
 
As with any industry, the construction industry requires effective relationship management on behalf of 
all parties involved in the process. ‘Successful relationship management requires trust, commitment, 
cooperation, open communication, goal alignment and joint problem solving.’ (Chueng et. al., 2005) 
Positive and open relationships between internal stakeholders could present opportunities to harness 
individual talents and strengthen collective ties between contracted parties for the benefit of all. ‘The 
creation and preservation of trust and cooperation, particularly in large construction projects, can unify 
the internal stakeholders to a positively-motivated mindset and result in an environment that is more 
harmonious and efficient.’ (Oxbrough & Swift, 2019)  
 
An interesting concept - which has until recently often been over-looked in the construction industry, 
but which has been around for some time in other industries of – is the notion of Emotional Intelligence 
or EI. ‘EI can be broadly defined as the knowledge and / or competencies to effectively deal with 
emotions to regulate social and emotional behaviors’. (Pekaar et.al, 2018; Petrides, 2011; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990; Zeidner et. al., 2008) Songer and Walker (2004) further expand upon this by adding the 
components of inter- and intra-personal intelligence. Interpersonal intelligence being defined as ‘ability 
to effectively communicate with and respond to others. Whereas intrapersonal intelligence refers to the 
ability to understand oneself and to use such information effectively in regulating one’s life.’ These 
concepts will be part of the results and discussion section later on in the paper and form an important 
part in understanding the results. Songer and Walker concluded; 
 
(Their) study found that General Contracting employees scored considerably lower than 
the general population on Interpersonal levels. This deserves considerable attention. As 
previously discussed, communication and interactions between project participants is 
important to the success of a project. Therefore, to increase the likelihood of a project 
being successful, project participants need to have high levels of interpersonal skills. 
According to this study, this is not the case for the current state of the General 
Contracting sector.  
  
As is so often the case in construction projects, particularly towards the completion date, there is an 
urgent requirement for answers and resolutions. In a study where personality traits of engineers and 
architects were measured against performance in providing and administering design services, Carr et. 
al (2002) found that those who were most capable of delivering ‘immediate attention in a crisis’ were 
those who ‘would not rush to judgment and who keep the options open until all possibilities for 




performance within… construction administration of a project is in the way one is open to alternatives 
and the way options are thoroughly explored’ 
 
 
2.18 Research Gaps 
 
There has been substantial coverage of the issue of duality in the role of the Superintendent for decades 
now, which begs the question as to why there has been no significant change in the way the role is 
undertaken. There appears to be little coverage of the topic of superintendent duality when also 
undertaking the role of the designer, which is also surprising given the seemingly obvious potential for 
conflict, and the relatively high incidence of this occurring in the Australian commercial construction 
industry.  
 
Further, there seems to be very little research or evidence surrounding the decisions made by a 
superintendent during the course of a project and how these decisions can impact a project or a 
relationship. This is possibly due to the ultimate requirement for the principal to intervene should there 
be any ambiguity, and the lack of contractual engagement between a superintendent and a contractor. 
However, given the overwhelming industry engagement on the topic of superintendent duality and its 





















The above review has outlined the nature and the roles of various stakeholders that are party to a 
construct-only contract. The current arrangement in AS2124 & AS4000 whereby the Superintendent is 
also engaged as the lead designer clearly displays an inherent conflict of interest, which could easily 
manifest into creation of an adversarial, and as a result, an unfavourable project outcome.  
 
The above gives strength to the argument that the engagement of a third-party Superintendent would 
benefit the outcome of a project. Whilst the residual conflict of the Superintendent being financially 
remunerated for services by the Principal will remain, the possibility that Superintendent decision-
making being influenced by the emotional and reputational connection to the design is mitigated. Whilst 
the definition, and implications of what is required of the Superintendent under the standard contract 
forms exist, and are quite consistent, there is a clear gap in the literature in the specific case of the lead 
designer also acting as Superintendent.  
It is irrefutable there is the potential for a conflict when the architect is also engaged to administer and 
assess possible shortfalls and omissions in their own documentation, there is no known data which might 
suggest that this has caused significant impact to the industry. There is however, an inherent conflict in 
all Superintendents who may be engaged by, or even an employee of, the Principal. This role will 
continue to create the potential for an adversarial relationship within the internal stakeholders to a 
construction contract. Further, and maybe more importantly, is the role that the Superintendent plays in 
public works contracts. There is a clear requirement for impartiality beyond what has been stipulated or 
implied in the current suite of Standard Form contracts. The argument remains that whilst the 
Superintendent in any contract is employed and remunerated by the Principal, the potential for a conflict 
of interest will exist. 
 
The only conceivable in the private commercial industry solution is that of Superintendent remuneration 
from an external, public entity for projects over a certain sum, and of a certain nature. This will eliminate 
conflicts of personal and entity interests, and also mitigate any potential reputational influences for 
Superintendents who have been party to the design. The only residual conflict that may remain would 
be individual and possibly historical, which comes with the emotional element of contract 
administration. 
 
With respect to the public industry the solution is paradoxical to the above, through the engagement of 
a totally independent private consultancy, who is equal parts funded by both the Principal and the 
contractor as a portion of the contract sum, and for contracts over a certain amount only. Similarly, this 




will ensure the public interest is maintained, and contractors who enter into government funded projects 
are assured a fair and impartial outcome. 
 
The wider effects of mitigating these potential conflicts revolve around creating a more harmonious, 
and less adversarial environment in the construction industry. It is naïve to deny that much of the 
incongruity that is part-and-parcel with daily interactions in the commercial construction is influenced 
by the perceived bias of the assessing parties. The creation of an ‘us versus them’ mentality adds to what 
is already an under-performing, and relatively inefficient industry that requires major improvement 
across many areas. In many ways the existential survival of the industry which potentially risks total 
automation of construction methods, depends on the increased efficiency and quality on the whole. As 
investors and governments search for more cost-effective measures in order to create more infrastructure 
and development, any changes which provide increased efficiency need to be implemented and adapted 































The information collection process is outlined in Figure 7. Supporting evidence for the research will be 
gathered through various methods of data collection, as follows: 
 
• Student created questionnaire to be issued to a minimum of 15 industry representatives, with 
relevant experience in the topic scenario, of the following internal stakeholder groups: 
o Head Contractors (Builders); 
o Architects (Superintendents); 
o Consultants (Engineers etc.); 
o Principals. 
• Retrieve, collate and analyse information from respondents; 
• Using the above information, in conjunction with literature review, provide suggestions for 
ways to improve internal stakeholders’ relations, mitigate risk of delays and unnecessary 
expenditure due to potential conflict of interest, and highlight the necessity for change within 























3.1.1 Data collected from Questionnaire  
 
The initial section of the questionnaire will gain demographic information of the respondents, i.e.  
industry, experience, field of work etc. This information will be used to group respondents into 
categories to ensure bias is taken into account and provide further evaluation on an industry-specific 
basis. 
 
The proceeding section will encompass questions asked of the individual respondents’ experiences 
specific to the role of the superintendent, who is also undertaking design. These questions will be 
formative of the conclusions drawn in the paper and will be used to gauge the industry’s stance on the 
way the current superintendent contractual arrangements are carried out, if there is indeed a requirement 
for change. 
  
The specific responses required in the questionnaire will be posed using the Likert scale drop box, 
enabling respondents to rate their response in relation to a question using a five-option drop-box, for 
example: 
 




5. Strongly Agree 
 
The options for response will vary depending on the type of question, however the premise of the five-
option drop-box will remain the same throughout.  
 
There are other multiple option questions, which will ask the respondent to rate their experiences of 
certain scenarios out of five. The use of ‘multiple choice grid’, as shown in Figure 7, will be used for 







Figure 8: Multiple Choice Grid 
 
 
The penultimate section will propose a remedy to the conflict, should it exist, and gain an understanding 
of the respondents’ position in terms of the author-created recommendations. The section will also try 
to understand if the author’s proposal is viable, and in particular, what sections of the industry would be 
willing to implement these proposed changes, if any. 
 
A final section will allow the respondents to provide insight into their relevant experiences of the 
research specific scenario, which will aid in supporting the final recommendations. Further allocation 
will be provided for respondents to make ‘general comments’ in relation to the research and provide 
their understanding into how the standard contracts can be improved, or steps which can be taken in 
order to mitigate any potential conflict of interest. 
 
 
3.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaire Surveys 
 
Questionnaires can be a good way to extract information on topics which may usually be treated as 
confidential by individuals not wishing to incur any reputational or relational damage. As such, the 
questionnaire respondent can remain anonymous which can invoke a greater level of sincerity. By 
contrast, the anonymity of an individual respondent can impact credibility of responses received and 
impact the overall integrity of the survey. 
 
As this questionnaire predominantly asks respondents to select pre-filled answers, the validity of the 
questionnaire responses can be inaccurate due to the potential for respondents to rush or apply 
undermined thought processes to the relevant question. On the other hand, this pre-determined response 
list will provide definite results which are more readily able to be quantified and provide a relatively 




As with any survey, the results are dependent on the respondents’ individual interpretation of the 
questions posed. Using appropriate language, and removing ambiguity from the questions will be 
challenging, particularly given the different professional backgrounds of the respondents and their 
reaction of certain questions which may be perceived as biased. Further to this, when ‘…the intention 
is to examine differences between subgroups in a sample, studies have shown that people tend to give 
answers to questionnaires more according to a social norm than to the actual situation’ (Sjöström & 
Holst, 2009) and this poses as an unanticipated, but accepted risk to the validity of the results. 
 
The questionnaire survey is a tried and tested method of gauging a section of collective respondents and 
quantifying opinions and experiences into data. In terms of cost-effectiveness and time-efficiency, the 
questionnaire is most appropriate for this paper as it engages respondents on a level that does not come 
with additional costs and will not require extensive time spent on completion of the survey.   
 
 
3.1.3 Selection of Respondents 
 
Targeted respondents have been drawn from the authors personal contacts, and their wider industry 
contacts. This is a limited pool of contacts and is likely to be heavily biased in terms of people from the 
same vocational background i.e., contracting. To mitigate the impact of this, the author has approached 
the Society of Construction Law Australia (SOCLA) to place on social media, and SOCLA kindly 









3.1.4 Validation of Results 
 
Final data analysis will be based on the implementation of a Relative Importance Index (RII), which 
will RII ‘aid in finding the contribution a particular variable makes to the prediction of a criterion 
variable both by itself and in combination with other predictor variables.’ (Johnson & LeBreton, 2004) 
In the calculation of the Relative Importance Index (RII), the formula below will be used:  
 
Relative Importance Index (RII) % =      ∑ W 
 A∗ N 
 
Where, W—weighting given to each statement by the respondents and ranges from 1 to 5; A—Higher 
response integer (5); and N—total number of respondents. (Badu et. al., 2013) 
 
A number of graphs and tables will be used to visually represent the results of the survey. Questions 
will be grouped, as previously referenced, and the analysis will be apportioned in the same framework. 
The analysis of the questionnaire survey and the validity of the results will be supporting the conclusions 















The final section of this paper outlines the data as collected in the survey and analyses the sample to 
understand the relative industry position on the questions raised. Results of this will be quantified in a 
simple table for readability, and a portion of the conclusion drawn will be from this sample. Further 
conclusions will be drawn based on the authors research and learnings. Lastly, the paper will itemise 
strategies and draw conclusions on the current state of contractual implications of engaging the 
Superintendent as a lead designer on a construct-only contract by assessing the impact this may have on 
the project and industry at large. Recommendations will be made on the current Australian Standard 
contracts (AS2124 & AS4000), and how these definitions can be amended to reflect previously 
discussed industry opinion. Finally, the paper will propose a new role entirely, which apportions separate 
roles for an additional contractual party; namely an independent assessor. 
 
 
4.2 Questionnaire Survey Discussion 
 
The targeted respondents for this survey were broken down into four categories: 
 
1. Contractors; 
2. Consultants, i.e. architects, engineers etc.; 
3. Principals / Client; 
4. Other. 
 
To gain an understanding of bias on the part of the individual and in turn the collective, it was necessary 
to understand their vocation. Further, this question is important to gain insight into sample-size industry 














4.3.5 Nature of the Contractual Arrangement Responses 
 
Question 6 asked the more broader opinion question of whether the respondent believed that this type 
of contractual arrangement had a generally positive outcome. Table 5 (1.1) showed that in the majority 
of cases the respondents linked this type of contractual arrangement with the overall success of the 
project or projects with relatively strong feedback of 70% in terms of RII. When asked about the 
perceived adversarial nature of the project, respondents showed a slightly weaker response of 65%. 
Whilst this number is still high - given the commercial construction industry’s reputation as a combative 
and competitive environment - it could be viewed as a positive, or at least passive indicator given the 
neutrality of many of the respondents. 
 
 
4.3.6 Stakeholder Impact on the Project Responses 
 
Question 8 was broken down into four sub-questions and asked the respondent to give a value to the 
perceived impact a stakeholder may have on the project overall. The results can be seen in four 
subsections of section 2 on Table 5. Given the majority of the respondents were involved in contractor, 
is perhaps not a surprise that design issues are rated significantly higher (79%) than the other possible 
sources. However, there is evidence in research that these numbers may be skewed towards the higher 
number regardless due to a number of factors. When researching the impact of early contract 
involvement in design, Song et. al. (2009) noted that ‘compared to designers and owners, contractors 
have a higher level of construction expertise because of their specialized training, in-depth knowledge 
of construction materials, methods, and local practice.’  
 
Rated at 69% RII was the impact the principal has on the outcome of a project, again this could be 
considered as unsurprising given the heavy bias towards contractors in terms of respondents. In a 2002 
survey completed in the UK titled ‘Modelling the Satisfaction of Contractors: The Impact of Client 
Performance’, Soetanto & Proverbs concluded that ‘the further the distance between the client’s head 
office and the project, the higher the contractors’ satisfaction levels.’ Postulating that ‘perhaps, there is 
a greater tendency for the client to interfere and disrupt day-to-day progress when located close to the 






4.3.7 Superintendent Assessment under AS Standard Form Contracts Responses 
 
The proceeding questions discussed Superintendent fairness when assessing contractor variations and 
EOT claims, respectively. Both questions were responded to with approximately median impartiality, 
revealing that individual respondents generally believe that superintendent’s, in their experience, are 
deliberating in a satisfactory fashion. Given the respondents were largely from contractors, this is 
somewhat surprising. This should be an area that could be targeted for significant improvements, 
particularly as these assessments often mean the difference between a successful project, and an 
unsuccessful project. 
 
Following on from this was a question regarding the superintendents understanding of relevant 
legislation and overall contractual comprehension. The result here was heavily skewed to the negative, 
with nearly 60% of the respondents revealing that they disagree that superintendents have enough 
contractual understanding. This is a concerning result and highlights an area for reform if contracts are 
to be administered under the same arrangement as before. When broken down by industry representation 
of the respondents (see Figure 14), the chart reveals the trends in the results. Whilst the contractors’ 
responses are generally concentrated between the neutral and disagree perspective for all three 
questions, there is a stronger view of negativity when responding to the superintendents perceived 
contract knowledge.  
 
Conversely, the Principal’s view of the superintendent is that of a more positive notion, particularly in 
terms of impartiality of assessments. The chart does show a negative swing when looking at the 
contractual knowledge of the superintendent, however the mean response still sits above the neutral line. 
   
The consultants’ responses are more inconsistent and show no real favour to either side of the argument, 
this is perhaps not surprising given their position as a stakeholder on a project is often a conduit between 
contractor and superintendent. Their response, as with the others, dips down into the negative when 

















































When these responses were broken down by industry representation the results were mixed, as seen in 
Figure 15. Regarding the definition of the role under AS contracts, the mean response for contractors 
was negatively skewed. The principal and consultant respondents tended slightly towards agreeing, 
however this was only marginal, and the largely neutral responses were perhaps due to the conflicting 
nature of the role, and the position of the respondents who are so often caught between superintendent 
and contractor management.   
 
Positively, the overwhelming response remained positive with regard to the third-party superintendent 
role across the board. This was most prevalent in the principal’s responses, with the mean response 
between agree and strongly agree, with a single outlier as neutral. The consultant response was slightly 
more reticent with outliers of both extremes, whilst the contractors were largely approving with only a 
single outlier strongly disagreeing with the concept. 
 
Finally, with regards to the question of equal remuneration, the strongest response came from the 
consultant respondents. All consultant responses were either neutral or better, whilst the principals took 
a more conservative approach to this idea and the mean response showing a 50/50 split between the 
respondents. The contractor’s responses were mixed, with outliers towards either extreme, with their 
mean response hovering slightly more agreeable than neutral. (See Figure 16) 
 
One of the more interesting comments was submitted by a contractor who strongly disagreed both with 
the concept of the third-party superintendent and the contractor / client equal remuneration. There is 
“…no point having the contractor pay equal half of a third-party superintendent when the client actually 
pays the contractor for that in the prelim(inaries). Having a third party superintendent will not solve the 
issues of unfair bias in assessments relating to the poor standard of documentation and design we deal 
with, any third party superintendent will still be fearfull (sic) of retribution by the other Architect, when 
the shoe is on the other foot on the next project. You need a completely separate superintendent body to 




















































Survey Questionnaire – Relative Importance Index (RII) 
 
 
Response Frequency  
RII (%) 1 2 3 4 5 
1 - Nature of the project 




























2 – Stakeholder Impact on the outcome of the 
 project 
2.1 - Design related 0 0 11 11 9 79 
2.2 - Principal related 1 3 12 11 4 69 
2.3 - Contractor related 2 5 14 7 3 63 
2.4 - External factors 7 9 10 5 0 48 
3 - Superintendent assessment 












3.2 - Fairness and impartiality when assessing 













3.3 - Contractual knowledge and understanding  5 13 4 9 0 51 
4 – Current role of the superintendent under AS  
Standard form contracts 
4.1 – Is there adequate definition under AS contracts for 













4.2 – Do you think the engagement of a third-party 
Superintendent would improve the outcome of these 



















4.3 - Would you agree with the third-party 
superintendent being remunerated by the contractor and 



































































This section aims to compile and rationalise the recommendations and limitations resultant from the 
research entailed in this paper. The recommendations made intend to mitigate cost impacts as a result 
of disputes arising from decisions made by the Superintendent, or other similar contract administrators, 
in all forms of construction contracting where the duality exists. The possible result of this reduction in 
disputation is a better and more harmonious project environment, which aims to reduce cost and delay 





Generally, the research undertaken has aimed to fulfil the obligations as expressed in Section 1.3. For 
the most part, these objectives have been met and the final portion of the paper should provide 
satisfaction of all the objectives.  
 
The Questionnaire Survey provided a wide array of results from different representatives of the industry. 
One of the disappointing results was the types of respondents involved, and the lack of equitable 
coverage from across the board. There are obvious limitations with this type of response, this will be 
discussed in the corresponding section, however this bias towards the contractors’ perspective of the 
research is evident. The survey was conducted over a period of two weeks, which with hindsight, should 
perhaps have been extended to a month or more. This was partially due to lack of foresight and a 
thorough understanding of the ethical requirements for conducting a survey of this nature.  
 
One of the major achievements of this paper has been in the response of people, informally and formally 
but outside of this paper. Co-authoring a paper on a topic similar to this at the Society of Construction 
Law Australia’s National Conference in August, including giving a 25-minute presentation in front of 
some of the industry’s most knowledgeable construction law practitioners and academics, was certainly 
one of the highlights of my academic-professional career. The response from many of the individuals 
involved at that conference was almost uniformly in agreeance with the proposal, and this has provided 






Touching on a topic that has been so heavily researched, and yet has shown so little change in the past 
decades – whilst the industry has been subject to major overhauls across the board – creates a form of 
false economy in terms of genuine prospect for reform. The role of the superintendent, or similar, is a 
construction staple and has been around, some claim, for over 400 years. There is an inclination for 
complacency in this area, and despite the apparent majority willing to change, it seems unlikely to occur 





This section will provide an undertaking on some of the shortcomings of the research, in line with the 
research objectives noted in Section 1.3, and will be the precursor to the next section, Further Work. 
 
One of the major limitations to this project, and projects of this nature, is information which is held by 
organisations as ‘commercial-in-confidence’. This retention of information is understandable however 
it makes it difficult to learn from the past as a collective industry, and those lessons remain ‘in-house’. 
This limitation was foreseeable to some extent, however there was an expectation that industry 
representatives may have been more forthcoming with information – even if it remained anonymous 
and undefined. This was not the case however, and perhaps this is unsurprising given the current 
environment in which the commercial construction world functions in.  
 
Another limitation was access to human resources in terms of variety of sources, particularly in relation 
to consultants and principals. Again, there were commercial restrictions in this instance which made 
individuals reluctant to respond to the survey, regardless of the fact the responses were anonymous. This 
was always a risk to the project that was hoped to be mitigated through the anonymity of the respondent, 
however this wasn’t fully realised, and the quantity of respondents was weaker than anticipated. Added 
to this, there is a reluctance for individuals to complete surveys of this nature due to lack of interest in 
the topic or being ‘too busy’. In an attempt to mitigate this potential indifference, the survey was kept 
short (approximately 5 – 10 minutes, 15 questions). It is noted that of 54 respondents who started the 
survey, 21 did not complete (see Appendix C). This may be due to the fact that they had not worked on 







5.4 Further Works 
 
The works completed in this research provides a solid foundation for what is necessarily requires a major 
overhaul in the industry. More comprehensive industry opinion should be gained by undertaking a more 
detailed survey, with a larger respondent group with greater industry representation by the various 
stakeholders. This may require an industry body to take on the idea, and broadcast this over the various 
channels to gain access to a wider, more engaged participants. The support of an industry body would 
also provide much needed credibility to the research and provoke conversation about an important issue 
in the industry. Noting this, there are consistent indications that there is a conflict of interest with regard 
to the engagement of the superintendent and their contractual obligations, particularly in the instance of 
a construct only contract where the superintendent is also the lead designer.  
 
Provided the right opportunities, there is additional scope to consider case studies of various relevant 
projects, however there would be significant limitations with regards to private entity’s and commercial-
in-confidence. The study required to attain information regarding the impact of decision-making by the 
superintendent would be most appropriately undertaken by a government body, where there may be a 
residual commitment for transparency between contracted parties. Further limitations to take case 
studies are in relation to the idiosyncrasies of each project which can largely not be reflected on paper. 
An example of this is in reference to variations and extension of time claims - and the various impacts 
of stakeholders and the broader environment can impact on the project. Types of variations and 
consequent extensions of time claims can be totally unrelated to design discrepancies (which can be a 
major cause of disputation), and as such, measuring these claims would not be relevant. The information 
provided in the case study would need to be specified to the impact of the superintendent decision-
making of variation and EOT claims made by the contractor specifically with regard to errors or 
omissions in design. This becomes a very niche subject and would require definitive parameters to be 
set prior to the commencement of the research. The study would still provide important research and the 
information deduced could perhaps be used in tailoring the commonly used standard form contracts in 
order to create and maintain a level of equitable treatment by the administering body in construct only 
commercial contracts. 
 
A consideration that was not given in this research is the potential impact of the inclusion of time bars, 
or deadlines, for contractual submissions and assessments. There should be consideration as to the 
addition of these to the standard form contract to create an additional element of accountability for 
contracted parties. The inclusion of this element could have the potential to improve stakeholder 




been approved, however the claim has been assessed and paid for. Many contractors see this as a ‘pay 
when paid’ arrangement, which would be an illegal action between contractor and subcontractors. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, this function requires both parties to be prompt and decisive 
with submissions and assessments. On larger projects the consequences of this mean that intellectual 
knowledge regarding specific claims are not lost due to turnover of staff (as can often occur), and that 
the substantiation of a claim is fully traceable. Consideration would need to be given to the increased 
administration of this contractual inclusion, however systematic procedures and itemised proformas 
included in the head contract, as seen in the Defence suite and GC21 contracts, would reduce labourious 
submissions and ensure consistency in claims. 
 
There is certainly scope for further works in the area of proper administration of contract. As revealed 
in the Arcadis report mentioned in Section 2.9, this is a global issue and one that causes significant 
disputation in the industry. Inclusion of Australia in this report would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the impact of poor contract administration in the country and provide a solid foundation 
for further works. Throughout this study it has become evident that contract administering individuals 
and their body’s need further education, and all parties involved in commercial contracting require 
greater knowledge around the implications of their actions and omissions. There are other contributing 
factors to this, such as; contractor submission & substantiation of claims, and stakeholder understanding 
of contractual obligations, however, these would be considered outside the scope of this research. 
 
Whilst this research focused predominantly on the AS construct only contracts, there is real potential 
for more analysis between other forms of contracts. In particular, there appears to be genuine attempts 
at contractual mitigation of disputes and conflicts in the GC21 and ABIC MW contracts. The GC21 
contract in particular encourages stronger contractor participation in design and construction by 
removing the parameters which can be exploited through the construct-only requisite of a contract. 
Whilst the ABIC suite has fundamentally the same conflict in the superintendent’s role, there is evidence 
of reduced disputes and this is something that needs to be explored further to understand the reasons 






The formative recommendation to come from this research, is the division of the role of the 
administration of the contract - between a principal’s representative, and an independent assessor, as 
proposed in Oxbrough & Swift (2019).  
 
The principal’s representative would likely be an employee of the principal, and it is proposed they 
would be of an engineering, project management or quantity surveying background. Their functions 
under the contract would be limited to objective assessments such as issuing superintendent directions, 
ensuring contractors contractual obligations are being met, representing the principals best interests and 
their certification functions would be limited to the issuance of the certificate of practical completion 
after ensuring all obligations have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the principal. The reduction in 
assessing function (compared to that of the traditional superintendent), it is proposed, would 
consequently reduce disputes arising from assessments. 
 
‘The role (of the independent assessor) would necessarily be detached from the design and its 
management, eliminating emotional attachment to the project.  The benefits of this detachment from the 
design stem from the assessor’s ‘observer’ status; they will not be weighed down by the rigmarole of 
everyday project life. (Oxbrough & Swift, 2019) The proposal of the independent assessor prior to 
contract execution by the Contractor would create certain accountability and sense of equity at the 
inception of the project. On the surface, this may be considered as a type of quasi- effect, however the 
author, and the majority of respondents believe that there could be considerable benefits to these types 
of projects. Any potential conflicts of interest on behalf of the independent assessor would be legally 
required to be put forward prior to engagement, and there would be a specified amount of time for the 
Principal to review and dispute the proposed party. Should there be a failure to reach an agreement on 
the independent assessor during a contractually specified time, there would be an appropriate 
nominating body to assign the assessor. 
  
A summary of the proposed division of the superintendent role, the engagement procedure and specified 











There is a broader issue than is outlined in this paper, and that surrounds the conflicting role of the 
superintendent across all projects, not just those eluded to above. The focus now needs turns to an 
industry that is in serious need, however, has a track record for reluctance to embrace change. In a recent 
article for The Fifth Estate (2019), Western Sydney University’s David Chandler OAM FAIB stated 
‘(t)here is unanimous agreement that construction efficiency is poor, its supply chains deeply 
fragmented, and, despite record recent activity, construction margins remain at unsustainable levels to 
deal with the risks involved.’ What will never be unanimous is how to resolve these problems, but 
mitigating and eliminating conflicts of interest, where possible, is a step in the right direction. Whilst 
the role of the superintendent and the functions they currently possess under contract are merely 
symptomatic of the broader issues that face the industry, changes to these types of antiquated and clearly 
biased arrangements should be resolved in a definitive manner, and the standard form contracts should 









Appointed, and paid for by the 
Principal. 
 
Nominated and agreed to by contracted 
parties, in instance of disagreement, 





Issuing directions, providing 
information, and undertaking functions 




Decision-making and certification 
functions (excluding issuance of 








Shared equally by Principal & 
Contractor. 




Of particular interest to this paper are the Standards Australia forms. Whilst it may be possible these 
(AS2124 & AS4000) are widely used in Australia - due to their ease of amendment and suitability to 
avert risk on the client’s behalf - establishing a contract which in its purest form is genuinely equitable 
to both contracting parties should be the minimum requirement. Ambiguous terms such as those which 
supposedly govern the role of the superintendent under these AS contracts should be explicit and, as 
recommended in this paper, the assessment function of the superintendent should be stripped and 
divided, adding a third-party, independent assessor as the nominated appraising party. 
 
Further training and knowledge sharing is required for all parties to commercial construction contracts. 
There is a seemingly a significant knowledge gap between those who possess meaningful contract 
comprehension and those who do not. Construction is big business, and an industry that warrants higher-
skilled and more educated individuals, particularly those who are administering contracts which are 
constantly escalating in terms of value. Risk is an inherent part of commercial contracting, however 
mitigating risk by training and up-skilling workers, from all facets of an organisation, would be a 
considered and recommended approach. There is also capacity for those who are administering contracts 
to be legislatively required to provide a formal qualification and show evidence of Continuing 
Professional Development (CPD). As the value of projects escalate, so do the disputes, and 
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Appendix A – Project Specification 
ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
Project Specification 
For:   Alexander Swift 
Title:  Conflict of Interest of Dual-Role Superintendent / Lead              
    Designer in Construct Only Contracts 
Major:   Management 
Supervisors:  Dr. Nateque Mahmood 
  TBC 
Enrolment:  ENG4111 – EXT S1, 2019 
  ENG4112 – EXT S2, 2019 
Project Aim:  To investigate and analyse the potential impacts of dual-role  
  Superintendent / Lead Designer on overall outcome of  
  construction projects. 
 
Programme: Revision 1, March 2019. 
1. Review the role of Superintendent under current Australian Standard (AS) construct-
only contracts, and compare to other relevant, industry-specific contracts; 
2. Examine existing literature on the role of the Superintendent, the requirement for 
impartiality and the potential limitations of neutrality when involved in the design 
process; 
3. Analyse the data collected from Case studies in reference to the impact Dual-role 
Superintendents have on the outcome of the project in terms of budget, time and 
stakeholder relations; 
4. Produce data based upon a project specific Questionnaire through the Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) and Relative Importance Index (RII) methods of assessment; 
5. Outline potential areas of improvement within the AS contracts, and propose changes 
that could be applied to mitigate aforementioned impacts; 
If time and resources permit: 
6. Analyse other forms of contract e.g. GC-21, HC-1, ABIC and provide comparative data 
on the effectiveness of ‘third-party’ Superintendent; 
7. Amalgamate results of (4) and (6) to provide overall data analysis and conclude which 
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Dissertation Survey - Conflict of Interest: Dual Role
Superintendent
This survey is for support of my final year thesis and completion of the Bachelor of Construction (Hons) at University of Southern
Queensland (USQ), Toowoomba, QLD. If you have used AS2124 or AS4000 standard form contracts in a construct only
arrangement, I invite you to complete this survey. 
Objectives of this research:
Understand the typical roles of the internal stakeholders in a construct-only contract;
Understand the typical role of the Superintendent in the assessment and evaluation process;
Understand and analyse the impact the conflict of interest has on the overall outcome of a project, and on
relationships of internal stakeholders. Understand the limitations of ‘impartiality’ in the contractual context;
Develop strategies to mitigate the relational impacts resultant from the perceived conflict. Exploring the notion of
collaboration between internal stakeholders;
Propose and validate potential measures for change within the Standard form, and provide comparative and
evidence-based analysis against other industry-standard forms.
 
The survey consists of 15 questions, largely multiple choice, which will take between 10 - 15 minutes. Results can be
provided at the completion of the survey by emailing u1047285@umail.usq.edu.au
(mailto:u1047285@umail.usq.edu.au)
 
Participants Rights and Confidentiality:
 
The information supplied in this survey will remain confidential and will be stored securely until the completion of this
project, at which point it will be disposed. The information will be used in an ethical way, and all participants will remain
anonymous within the research. Participants have the right to withdraw from the study. The participant information
sheet is available here
(/upload/surveys/451335/files/Information%20Sheet%20%20Questionnaire%20Student%20Researcher%20v01.docx).
Completion and return of the survey grants implied consent, however you have the right not to answer any particular
question.
Contacts:
USQ Supervisor - Gary Elks
+61 7 4631 2454
Gary.Elks@usq.edu.au





There are 15 questions in this survey.
What area of the construction industry do you represent?  *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Contractor
 Consultant i.e. Architect, Engineer etc.
 Client / Principal
 Other 
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How long have you been working in the commercial construction industry? *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 0 - 5 years
 6 - 10 years
 11 + years
Have you been involved in a construction project or projects which has / have used
AS2124 or AS4000 as the head contract?  *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
How many ‘Construct Only’ projects have you been involved in where the
Superintendent is also the Lead Designer? *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 0
 1 - 5
 5 +
What has been the approximate value of these projects?  *
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
<$1 million
$1 million - $5
million
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Overall, would you say these project/s was/were a success?  *
 Choose one of the following answers






On a scale of 1-5, how adversarial have you found these types of contracts to be? 
1 being not adversarial - 5 being very adversarial.
*






Please place a value on the below key issues, in terms of the impact they have had
on the outcome of the project.  *
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
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Have you found the Superintendent to be fair and reasonable when assessing
variations? *
 Choose one of the following answers






Have you found the Superintendent to be fair and reasonable when assessing
Extension of Time claims? *
 Choose one of the following answers






Have you found the Superintendent to have reasonable contractual knowledge and
understanding?  *
 Choose one of the following answers






Do you think there is adequate definition, under AS2124 and AS4000, for the
Superintendent role to be ‘fair and impartial’ *
 Choose one of the following answers
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Do you think the engagement of a third party Superintendent would improve the
outcome of these types of construct only projects?
*
 Choose one of the following answers






Would you agree with the third party superintendent being remunerated by the
contractor and the client, equally?
*
 Choose one of the following answers






Please provide additional information that you may believe would be useful to this
study.
Please write your answer here:
13.09.2019 – 23:59
Submit your survey.
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